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Performance indicators and rankings in higher education1 
Introduction 
Publicly funded sectors are under pressure to use resources efficiently, and awarding funds on 
the basis of performance is one approach to trying to achieve a more efficient use of 
taxpayers’ money. Resource allocation to the UK higher education sector has long followed 
such a policy. The 1980s funding cuts to UK higher education prompted rapid development 
of performance indicators as a means of encouraging accountability: ‘…higher education 
policy was dominated by two main concerns: to help reduce public expenditure; and to 
increase efficiency by encouraging institutions to ‘earn’ a larger proportion of their income 
from both government and non-government sources, and to be explicitly accountable for it’ 
(Williams, 1992b, pp3-4). This observation strongly resonates with the current situation in 
English higher education.2 
The performance of a traditional firm is relatively straightforward to measure since it is 
typically assumed to have the objective of profit maximisation. The firm’s accounts therefore 
provide an indication of how well the firm is performing against this benchmark. Any firm 
where the assumption of profit maximisation is not applicable cannot have its performance 
assessed in this manner; non-profit institutions universities fall into this category and a 
conventional approach is inappropriate. In the UK, the need for performance indicators in the 
higher education sector has long been recognised (Department of Education and Science, 
1985). Proposed performance indicators initially focused on a particular output or operation 
(Jarratt, 1985) and were at best simple ratios such as the proportion of students with ‘good’ 
degrees or the cost per student. Media interest in these performance indicators was also 
stimulated and the performance of universities in certain key areas of interest to both tax 
                                                          
1 Jill Johnes, Professor of Production Economics, The Business School, University of Huddersfield, Queensgate, 
Huddersfield, HD1 3DH. I am grateful to Gerry Steele (Lancaster University) for comments on an earlier draft. 
2 See HEFCE, http://www.hefce.ac.uk/funding/efficient/. 
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payers and prospective students was put under the spotlight: for example, labour market 
destinations (Dixon, 1985); completion rates (Dixon, 1989); and achievement rates (Dixon, 
1976). 
It is a simple step to go from performance indicators to rankings and league tables. We 
should highlight at the outset the distinctions between performance indicators and university 
rankings; the differences revolve around the presentation and usage of the two. The former 
are usually a set of quantitative data on the performance of HEIs typically used by policy-
makers in assessing whether resources are being used efficiently. The latter are lists of HEIs, 
often produced by commercial publishers, ranked in descending order of performance 
according to a set of quantitative data and presented in the format of a league table (Usher 
and Medow, 2009). Rankings draw attention to relative performance, and have largely been 
aimed at the general public, in particular prospective students and their parents to help them 
in making an informed choice about their university. The first serious3 media rankings of 
universities and colleges (at the institution level) appeared in US News and World Report in 
1983 (Dill, 2009), and since 1994 the publication of university league tables based on various 
individual measures of performance has become commonplace in the UK, USA and 
elsewhere (Yorke, 1997). Distinctions between performance indicators and rankings are 
blurred by the fact that official performance data often underpin the rankings produced by the 
media. Moreover, interest and usage of rankings has widened to universities themselves (as 
an internal auditing and resource allocation tool) and to governments, especially with the 
recent development and regular publication of global rankings of universities across the 
world (for example, the ‘Shanghai rankings’, or the rankings of the Times Higher Education).  
                                                          
3 There have been some rankings of US HEIs produced prior to 1983. But these have been produced ad hoc and 
do not follow the methodology of many of today’s media rankings.  
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Higher education institutions (HEIs) are multi-product firms with complex production 
processes, so that indicators based on simple ratios (and rankings which utilize these ratios) 
are unlikely to capture the true picture of performance. My own PhD thesis, for which Gareth 
Williams was external examiner, represents an early attempt to address these issues and to 
suggest ways of measuring the value-added of HEIs rather than raw outputs (Johnes and 
Taylor, 1990b). In the ensuing thirty years, as techniques have developed to capture 
performance in a multi-output multi-input production framework, it has become possible to 
develop more sophisticated indicators. There is a trade-off, however, between simplicity and 
complexity; between providing indicators which are easy to construct and interpret, and 
computing performance measures which more closely capture the production process but 
whose construction is poorly understood by the layperson. The continued interest in media 
rankings suggests that simplicity is the current winner. But the simple approach can provide a 
misleading picture of performance with adverse consequences for institutional behaviour, as 
will be explored further in the following sections.  
This chapter examines the development and use of performance indicators and rankings in 
the context of higher education, from the use of individual indicators and their amalgamation 
into a composite measure, to the construction of efficiency measures from an economist’s 
perspective of universities as multi-product firms. The potential effects of these indicators 
and rankings on national policy and institutional behaviour are then considered together with 
proposals for an alternative way forward. The chapter ends with final conclusions. While the 
ideas and methodological approaches are of general application and interest, illustrative 
examples are typically from the UK. 
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Developing measures of performance in higher education: a simple approach 
Higher education in the UK and elsewhere often receives funding from government. This can 
be potentially problematic as the objectives of those funding higher education and those 
running universities may not be in alignment leading to a classic principal-agent problem 
(Johnes, 1992). The government which provides the funds (the principal) can only 
imperfectly observe the actions of those running the HEIs (the agents) and so resorts to 
performance indicators to ensure that its own goals are being met. This raises the question of 
how to construct meaningful performance indicators. 
One approach to performance measurement involves deriving various indicators and using 
these (or a subset) for a particular purpose. For example, funding for a particular activity can 
be given on the basis of performance in that area; or prospective students might examine 
performance in areas which are of particular relevance to their own interests. In arriving at a 
set of appropriate performance indicators, two main issues need to be initially addressed: 
i) Level of analysis: What are the entities being measured? 
ii) Dimensions: What are the dimensions by which performance should be measured? 
The separate performance indicators produced by official agencies such as the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) and the Higher Education Statistics 
Agency (HESA) in the UK are used (often by the media) to produce rankings of universities 
which purport to highlight relative performance of HEIs over a spectrum of dimensions. Thus 
a third issue which needs to be addressed is: 
iii) Weights: How can individual dimensions be aggregated into one composite index? 
We will consider each of these in turn. 
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Level of analysis 
Within higher education, we might want to measure the performance of individual academics, 
departments, academic programmes, institutions or even the whole sector (against higher 
education sectors in other countries). The level of analysis depends on the targeted audience 
and the purpose of the evaluation. The opening statement of HESA on their performance 
indicators which they have published since 2002/03 (prior to which these were published by 
HEFCE) makes it clear that the entity in which they are interested is the higher education 
provider i.e. the university.4 Lower-level performance (eg of departments), however, might 
be of interest to managers within institutions, and country-level performance to governments 
interested in the performance of the domestic higher education sector relative to those of 
global competitors.  
Dimensions 
The dimensions by which we measure university performance depend, like level of analysis, 
on the target audience and purpose of evaluation. In the context of government monitoring of 
university performance, the dimensions should relate closely to the outcomes from higher 
education most valued by society (Dill, 2009). Research and teaching are two obvious 
dimensions of interest. HEFCE undertakes a periodic review of UK universities’ research on 
behalf of all the funding councils. The most recent review was the Research Excellence 
Framework (REF) the results of which were published in 2014.5 This was preceded by 
various Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs) undertaken in 1986, 1989, 1992, 1996, 2001 
and 2008. The greater part of funds distributed by the funding councils to universities for 
research purposes have been allocated on the basis of REF/RAE results (Harman, 2011), and 
there is a clear link between funding and measured performance. The UK is not alone in 
                                                          
4 See HESA, https://www.hesa.ac.uk/pis. 
5 The results of the REF can be found here: http://www.ref.ac.uk/.  
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funding research in this way (Dill, 2009); Australia, for example, uses similar performance-
based schemes to fund research and research training.6 
The UK has no analogous mechanism for funding teaching, where student numbers drive 
allocations. Student numbers determine resources in two ways: through the university tuition 
fee; and through HEFCE resourcing which is currently linked to student numbers by subject.7 
The latter is therefore not performance-related and the former is linked to teaching 
performance only insofar as students might choose their university and programme on the 
basis of teaching reputation. In practice, of course, this requires reliable indicators to inform 
potential students. A Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) to mirror the REF is therefore 
currently being mooted in the UK as a means of linking funding to teaching performance 
with the explicit aim of improving teaching quality and ensuring students and taxpayers of 
efficient use of resources.8 
There may be more than two dimensions of interest, however, and a variety of performance 
indicators can be found. Jarratt (1985) provides an early attempt at suggesting performance 
indicators which could provide useful information to stakeholders. The development of 
performance indicators has steadily progressed in the UK since then with numerous 
indicators now being published annually (Pollard et al., 2013), and the media compile their 
own rankings from these official sources, as well as any additional data which they have 
collected. 
It is not difficult to find data on all aspects of university activities. HESA provides a huge 
amount of data on UK higher education including indicators relating to:9 widening 
participation rates; non-continuation rates; module completion rates; research output; and 
                                                          
6 See https://education.gov.au/research-block-grants.  
7 See http://www.hefce.ac.uk/lt/howfund/. 
8 See https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/teaching-at-the-heart-of-the-system. 
9 Source: https://www.hesa.ac.uk/pis accessed 29th June 2015. 
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graduate employment. The media address the requirements of prospective students whose 
interests lie with feedback from current students, the reputation of the institution or simply 
with the facilities at each institution. The Complete University Guide, for example, examines 
10 aspects of activity likely to be of interest to prospective students:10 entry standards; student 
satisfaction; research assessment; research intensity; graduate prospects; student-staff ratio; 
academic services spend; facilities spend; good honours; and degree completion.11 
Numerous dimensions can pose problems of interpretation if performance varies across 
different measures. Indeed there is no reason to expect that a university that is good in one 
area will necessarily be good in another. Take the rankings from The Complete University 
Guide. A simple rank correlation of the 10 measures in the most recent ranking (2015-16) 
illustrates the point (table 1). While the majority of indicators are highly correlated, 17 pairs 
have a correlation coefficient below 0.412. This means that a university’s position in the 
ranking changes dramatically depending on which indicator is used: one HEI, for example, is 
ranked top on academic services, second on research intensity, but bottom on facilities, and 
amongst the bottom 10 universities on student satisfaction. Indeed the student satisfaction 
indicator generally appears to provide a noticeably different picture compared to the other 
measures. This result should perhaps come as no surprise since, in contrast to the other 
variables, it is based on perceptions and opinions. 
Table 1 here 
The complexities of interpreting performance measures is surely apparent. If, like the media 
rankings, the objective is to use the quantitative data to produce a composite index of overall 
                                                          
10 Source: http://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/league-tables/methodology/ accessed 29th June 2015. 
Note that this particular university guide is chosen purely for illustrative purposes; conclusions form any 
analysis presented here can be generalised across all university guides. 
11 An additional environmental ranking, derived from a 2014 report from the Higher Education Academy 
(Drayson et al., 2014), is also provided for those interested in the ‘green’ credentials of universities. 
12 A rank correlation vale close to 1 represents a strong positive correlation while a value close to 0 indicates no 
relations between the variables. 
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performance then these disparate measures need to be combined into a meaningful aggregate 
index. This is not an insignificant problem. 
Weights 
The purpose of a single index derived from information across multiple indicators is to 
summarise information across dimensions and to provide an indicator that is easier to 
interpret than a set of many separate measures (Saltelli et al., 2005). This means that all parts 
of society can use the indicators, from policy-makers to the general public, and this promotes 
accountability. Comparisons can be made not just amongst the group of entities being 
assessed but also over time (assuming calculation is consistent over time). Deriving a single 
index requires a set of weights in order to aggregate the separate measures.  
The easiest approach is to apply an equal weighting across all indicators;13 alternatively 
different weightings can be assigned. The Complete University Guide assigns weightings of 
between 0.5 and 1.5 to the 10 individual measures (table 2). Different publications use 
different weightings (and underlying indicators). Publishers of media rankings generally do 
not explain why they have chosen these weightings, or the fact that other weightings could be 
equally legitimate and potentially provide different rankings (Usher and Medow, 2009). 
Table 2 here 
Ideally weightings should reflect the preferences of the target audience, but deriving 
preferences for a group from the preferences of the individuals within that group is 
notoriously difficult. To construct a meaningful overall index is therefore fraught with 
difficulties. Is any purpose served by computing a composite index? The danger is that the 
apparent ease of interpretation provided by a composite index conceals the fact that the 
                                                          
13 Performance indicators are usually standardised to produce a z-score before calculating an overall ranking. 
This ensures that the composite index is not affected by the units of measurement of the components underlying 
it. 
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picture of performance which it represents is misleading, particularly if a) it is 
unrepresentative of all the dimensions that it purports to cover and b) inappropriate 
weightings are used. This in turn can lead, for example, to inappropriate policy development 
or unsuitable choice of university by potential students. 
To illustrate these points, consider again The Complete University Guide where rankings 
from the overall indicator are strongly correlated with those from all the separate indicators 
with the exception of those relating to student satisfaction and facilities spend (table 2). 
Stakeholders for whom these dimensions are of particular interest would appear to be poorly 
served by the overall ranking. 
In the absence of information on the relative importance of each dimension (and hence of an 
appropriate weighting system), it might still be possible to reduce numerous indicators to a 
manageable number of dimensions using such techniques as principal components analysis, 
data envelopment analysis (in particular the ‘benefit of the doubt’ approach introduced by 
Cherchye et al. (2007)), the analytic hierarchy process, or co-plot (Johnes, 2015). Details and 
a critique of these techniques can be found elsewhere (Johnes, 2015; Saltelli et al., 2005). We 
can illustrate the potential advantages of using one of these techniques (principal components 
analysis) in the context of The Complete University Guide data. The objective of a principal 
components analysis is to explain as much of the variation in the original data (the 10 
dimensions in The Complete University Guide) with as few variables as possible. More 
details regarding principal components can be found in Saltelli et al. (2005).  
The weightings for each of the 10 principal components calculated from The Complete 
University Guide data are displayed in table 3 along with the associated percentage variation 
accounted for by each principal component. If we use the Kaiser criterion (Saltelli et al., 
2005) to select the principal components which are adequate to represent the data, we are left 
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with the first two principal components. The weights (table 3) of these two principal 
components suggest that the first principal component is mainly a combination of all 
dimensions apart from those reflecting student satisfaction and facilities spend, while the 
second principal components largely represents the combined dimensions of student 
satisfaction and facilities spend. This should come as no real surprise given the rank 
correlations already presented in table 1.  
Table 3 here 
A plot of the first two principal components is displayed in figure 1. Universities in the top 
right of the plot score highly on both principal components and therefore have good 
performance across all 10 dimensions. The converse is true of universities located to the 
bottom and left of the plot. The leading diagonal quadrants represent mixed performance. 
Numbers next to the plotted points in figure 1 are the rankings obtained in the composite 
measure (using the weightings as described above) of The Complete University Guide, with 1 
representing top performance14. Both the top- and bottom-ranked universities are in the top 
right and bottom left quadrants of the principal components plot, suggesting that the 
composite ranking and the principal components provide a similar message. There are, 
however, many instances where the messages from the composite ranking and the principal 
components plot are mixed. For example, the university ranked 113th in The Complete 
University Guide appears in the bottom right hand quadrant of the scatter plot: while it 
performs badly on 8 of the indicators, it is amongst the top 5 universities on the basis of the 
second principal component (reflecting student satisfaction and facility spend). Conversely, 
the university ranked 13th is in the top left hand quadrant but is amongst the bottom 5 on the 
basis of the second principal component (reflecting student satisfaction and facility spend). 
                                                          
14 Note that some rankings appear twice because of tied values. 
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Figure 1 here 
The rank correlations between the first two principal components and the overall ranking 
(table 4) confirm that performance across all ten dimensions is adequately captured neither 
by the first principal component nor the composite ranking. A single indicator is insufficient 
to capture all the information contained in these 10 measures. This finding is in line with 
results of a similar analysis of university rankings from The Guardian and the THES (see 
HEFCE, 2008, Appendix C). The general message is that, in trying to give a simple overview 
of performance, composite indicators can be misleading. As they sacrifice information which 
may be of interest or policy relevance to users of the performance assessment little is gained 
from their construction.  
Table 4 here 
Methods for measuring performance: an economist’s perspective 
Let us now return to the basic idea underpinning performance indicators, namely as tools for 
government to assess the efficiency with which HEIs use publicly provided resources. The 
simple approach to efficiency measurement already discussed derives separate indicators 
which at best reflect reputation and resources but do not adequately capture the efficiency of 
resource use. Efficiency requires a knowledge of  the outputs of universities, inputs going 
into those outputs, and the production relationship between them (Johnes and Taylor, 1990b). 
This invokes the idea of ‘value added’ or, from an economist’s perspective, ‘technical 
efficiency’.  
HEIs are multi-product organisations and produce (in simple terms) teaching, research and 
third mission (the last reflecting universities’ wider social engagement). Initial attempts to 
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derive measures of value added applied Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression methods15 
to separate measures of universities’ outputs (Johnes and Taylor, 1990b). At a time when 
proposed performance indicators included degree completions, classes of degrees, 
destinations of graduates and unit costs (Jarratt, 1985), such analyses proved useful in 
demonstrating that these suggested measures were affected by characteristics of the HEI. 
Thus much of the inter-university variation in unit costs was shown to be a consequence of 
subject mix, student mix and the ratio of students to staff (Johnes, 1990; Johnes and Taylor, 
1990b). Similarly much of the inter-university variation in the percentage of graduates 
gaining employment was explained by subject mix, along with factors such as the academic 
ability of students on intake and location of the HEI (Johnes and Taylor, 1989a; Johnes and 
Taylor, 1989b; Johnes and Taylor, 1990b). The percentage of students gaining firsts and 
upper seconds and non-completion rates were also strongly related to the academic ability of 
students recruited by universities as well as factors such as library facilities, the percentage of 
students living in halls, and type of university (Johnes, 1997; Johnes and Taylor, 1989c; 
Johnes and Taylor, 1990a; Johnes and Taylor, 1990b; Johnes and Taylor, 1990c).  
The problem with these analyses is that they separately examine the production of each 
output which raises the difficulty of  interpreting multi-dimensional information (Johnes, 
1996). Another problem is that the approach ignores synergies which surely exist in the 
university production process (Chizmar and McCarney, 1984; Chizmar and Zak, 1984). The 
reason that universities produce, for example, undergraduate and postgraduate teaching 
alongside research and interaction with business is that these are all joint products: there are 
                                                          
15 OLS regression is a common method for estimating a linear relationship between observations of a variable 𝑌 
(university output in this case) and an explanatory variable 𝑋 (or explanatory variables 𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑘). In the case of 
one explanatory variable it therefore provides estimates of the coefficients (or parameters) 𝑎 and 𝑏 in the linear 
relationship 𝑌 =  𝑎 +  𝑏𝑋. OLS regression relies on certain underlying assumptions in order for the parameter 
estimates to have desirable statistical properties. 
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savings from producing these within one production unit rather than separately. A simple 
portrayal of the higher education production relationship is provided in figure 2. 
Figure 2 here 
The idea of linking resource allocation to performance is that universities which are efficient 
at transforming inputs into outputs should receive more resources than those which are 
inefficient. Performance indicators should ideally represent the efficiency with which 
universities transform inputs into outputs. We are interested, for example, in how much more 
output universities could produce from given inputs (known as an output-oriented approach), 
or how many fewer inputs could be used to produce given outputs (known as an input-
oriented approach). Consider a visual presentation of the first of these questions. Let us 
assume that universities produce two outputs (say, graduates and research) from one input 
(say, staff). For the sector as a whole there will be a production possibility frontier (PPF), 
which represents the maximum outputs which can be achieved from given input with current 
technology (figure 3). 
Figure 3 here 
We can use this frontier as a benchmark against which the production of an individual 
university can be measured. In figure 3, the observed production point of university F (i.e. the 
combination of research/staff and teaching/staff) lies inside the PPF and so it is clearly less 
efficient than it could be. One way of measuring that inefficiency is to take a ray from the 
origin through point F, and projecting it on to the PPF at point F’.  The technical efficiency 
(TE) of university F is then measured as the ratio TE = OF/OF′. 
The problem is how to estimate the PPF (figure 3). OLS regression is clearly an 
unsatisfactory approach to estimating a frontier because it estimates an average vector 
through the data rather than a frontier. Resulting efficiency ratios will therefore be calculated 
15 
 
 
against an incorrectly estimated PPF. Furthermore, efficiency ratios derived from an OLS 
function are based on OLS regression errors.16  Two frontier estimation techniques have been 
developed which overcome these problems, and which help in the construction of 
performance indicators: data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA). We will briefly consider each of these approaches. 
DEA (Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984; Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978; Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes, 1979) is a non-parametric frontier estimation technique17 which can 
handle a production situation with both multiple outputs and multiple inputs, and does not 
require a priori specification of a functional form. It estimates using linear programming 
methods a piecewise linear PPF (see figure 4) which allows the performance of each 
institution to be measured relative to institutions with similar missions or objectives. This 
makes DEA attractive in the context of higher education where missions and objectives can 
differ substantially. An additional merit of DEA is that it provides benchmark information to 
those institutions which are performing inside the frontier. In figure 4, point F’ represents a 
more efficient virtual production point to which university F should aspire. Since point F’ is a 
linear combination of the outputs (relative to input) of universities B and C, target input and 
output levels can be derived, to which university F should aspire.  
Figure 4 here 
There are many examples of empirical studies which have applied DEA (and related non-
parametric techniques) to measuring the efficiency of universities (Beasley, 1990; Beasley, 
1995; Duh et al., 2014; Fandel, 2007; Flegg and Allen, 2007; Flegg et al., 2004; Giménez and 
Martínez, 2006; Glass et al., 2006; Johnes, 2006; Johnes, 2008; Johnes, 2014b; Thanassoulis 
                                                          
16 An underlying assumption of OLS regression is that the errors are randomly distributed, hence estimated 
efficiencies are highly unsatisfactory (Johnes, 1996). 
17 Non-parametric estimation means that the technique does not rely on any underlying assumptions such as the 
data being distributed in a certain way.  
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et al., 2011). DEA studies of UK universities tend to find that average efficiency across the 
sector as a whole is fairly high (typically 80% or above), but the specific findings depend on 
sample used (the more restricted the sample the higher the average efficiency) and the time 
period covered. DEA has also been used to assess the efficiency of individual academic 
departments or programmes within an institution (Casu, Shaw and Thanassoulis, 2005; 
Colbert, Levary and Shaner, 2000; Kao and Hung, 2008; Kao and Liu, 2000; Moreno and 
Tadepalli, 2002; Ray and Jeon, 2008), central administration or services across universities 
(Casu and Thanassoulis, 2006; Simon, Simon and Arias, 2011), and to make efficiency 
comparisons across different national education systems  (Giménez, Prior and Thieme, 2007).  
DEA is a deterministic non-parametric approach, with the disadvantages that random 
fluctuations in the data are not allowed for, there are no conventional tests of significance or 
methods for drawing inference, and efficiency estimates are particularly affected by sample 
size. This means that great care should be taken in choosing the variables to represent the 
inputs and outputs in any DEA model; the model specification should be consistent with the 
higher education production process. In addition DEA has not been extended to address 
specific issues of modelling in a panel data context. In its favour, recent developments in 
DEA include the incorporation of bootstrapping techniques18 to produce confidence intervals 
and bias-corrected estimates of efficiency, and the development of hypothesis tests to assess 
the significance of specific inputs and/or outputs (Banker, 1996; Johnes, 2006; Pastor, Ruiz 
and Sirvent, 2002).  
Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is a parametric frontier estimation method, which allows 
for stochastic errors in the data (figure 5) and provides parameter estimates and associated 
                                                          
18 In statistics bootstrapping is a method which relies on random sampling (with replacement) of the original 
data in order to estimate a sampling distribution of a required statistic. In the context of DEA, bootstrapping 
techniques can, for example, generate a sampling distribution for the efficiency score which then allows 
estimation of a confidence interval around the score. See Johnes (2004b) for more detail. 
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significance tests (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977). 
Following Jondrow et al. (1982) SFA also allows the estimation of technical efficiency for 
each university. These features of SFA make it an attractive methodological tool which has 
frequently been used particularly in studies relating to policy development (Abbott and 
Doucouliagos, 2009; Johnes, Johnes and Thanassoulis, 2008; Johnes and Schwarzenberger, 
2011; Johnes, 2014b; McMillan and Chan, 2006; Stevens, 2005).  
Figure 5 here 
Many of the SFA empirical studies relate to the context of university costs where SFA lends 
itself to the framework of a single left-hand side variable (costs) and multiple right-hand side 
variables. Average efficiency levels for the English higher education sector are estimated to 
be around 70% and there is considerable variation around this mean (Johnes, Johnes and 
Thanassoulis, 2008; Johnes et al., 2005). The parameters of the SFA cost function can be 
used to estimate the presence of economies of scale (reduction in cost per unit from 
increasing output) and economies of scope (reduction in costs from producing two or more 
outputs jointly); recent evidence reveals that typically economies of scale are exhausted and 
that there are diseconomies of scope in English higher education (Izadi et al., 2002; Johnes 
and Johnes, 2009; Johnes, Johnes and Thanassoulis, 2008; Johnes et al., 2005). This suggests 
that, for the HEI of average size, there are no further opportunities for economies of scale 
from expansion in size; moreover, the existence of diseconomies of scope suggests that the 
opportunities for economies from sharing resources across different outputs have been 
exhausted (indeed HEIs may already be producing too many outputs simultaneously). 
An exception to these SFA empirical studies of costs is one by Johnes (2014b) who examines 
technical efficiency in a multi-input, multi-output framework. Average efficiency levels for 
the English higher education sector are estimated to be around 70% to 80%, and the estimated 
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parameters provide insights into potential input substitutability: there is least scope for 
substituting between academic staff and administrative inputs whilst academic staff and 
capital are the inputs with the greatest potential for substitution. Perhaps of greater interest 
(particularly from a policy viewpoint) is that universities which ultimately merge typically 
have greater flexibility in terms of input substitution than those which do not (Johnes, 2014a). 
The downside of the SFA approach is that the assumptions which underpin it (regarding the 
distribution of efficiencies and the stochastic error, as well as the functional form of the 
function being estimated) are often made for ease of analysis; results can be biased as a 
consequence. SFA is not a benchmarking tool and provides no precise information on how 
managers of an institution can alter inputs and/or outputs to improve their efficiency. 
In comparisons of DEA and SFA applied to higher education, SFA generally provides lower 
efficiency estimates than DEA, and rank correlations of efficiencies derived from the two 
methods are positive but very low (Johnes, 2014b; Kempkes and Pohl, 2010). Policy-makers 
and users of performance indicators should be aware that the relative position of universities 
is not consistent across methodological approaches. 
Potential effects of performance indicators and rankings 
We consider in this section the effects on subsequent efficiency of measuring performance 
using the simple and frontier approaches. 
Measuring performance using individual indicators or a composite index 
The problem with the simple approach stems directly from what might seem its main 
advantage: transparency – of the method and the data used. While this makes it easy for a 
HEI to see its strengths and weaknesses and alter behaviour accordingly, it also means that 
rankings are open to manipulation and gaming. According to Goodhart’s “law”, a variable 
which is used to measure performance is open to manipulation by those whose performance 
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is being measured (Johnes, 1992; Pollard et al., 2013). Changing behaviour is a desirable 
consequence of performance measurement only if the changed behaviour genuinely improves 
performance rather than simply rank. 
Rankings are important to individual institutions: national and global rankings can be used by 
other institutions to identify suitable collaborative partners; they can be used by students to 
inform their choice of university; by prospective academic employees seeking new posts ; 
and by employers for recruitment (Hazelkorn, 2015; Saisana, d’Hombres and Saltelli, 2011). 
This means that a university has an incentive to change its behaviour in response to the 
rankings; but changed behaviour may not benefit performance.    
Many popular measures of performance are under the control of the HEI. Graduation rates, 
for example, can be improved by more effective teaching delivery – the desired effects of 
university performance assessment – or by lowering standards (so-called ‘grade inflation’), 
on which there is mixed evidence in the UK and USA (Bachan, 2015; Johnes, 2004a; Johnes 
and Soo, 2015; Popov and Bernhardt, 2013). More generally, there is confirmation of concern 
from senior managers of universities that some measures in league tables are vulnerable to 
‘cheating’ behaviour (Rolfe, 2003), and evidence that universities are manipulating, or 
influencing data in order to raise their rankings (Hazelkorn, 2015). There have been claims, 
for example, that students have been pressured to provide favourable responses to the 
National Student Survey in the UK (Newman, 2008). Gaming behaviour by universities is 
unlikely to achieve the efficiency objective of performance assessment: ‘The pernicious 
effect of this competitive pursuit of academic prestige is that it is a highly costly, zero-sum 
game, in which most institutions as well as society will be the losers, and which diverts 
resources as well as administrative and faculty attention away from the collective actions 
within universities necessary to actually improve student learning …’ (Dill, 2009, p6).  
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Gaming behaviour can mislead those using university rankings. National policy towards 
higher education, for example, can be based on fallacious information: a policy of merging 
HEIs is being rolled out in France, Russia and China in the belief that global rankings of 
domestic HEIs can be favourably affected (Shin and Toutkoushian, 2011). Merger policy has 
also been promoted in the UK in the belief that greater size leads to greater visibility in the 
world rankings as well as greater efficiency (Jump, 2014). Given the problems with rankings, 
however, much more research into the wider likely effects of any policy initiative should be 
undertaken; in the case of merger policy, there has been little statistical research into the 
benefits of merging universities and this is an area which should be explored further (Johnes, 
2014b). 
Even if gaming behaviour is not a serious problem, by focusing on improvement of the 
components which underpin the media rankings, HEIs are in danger of becoming much more 
homogeneous. For example, the underlying components of the rankings are often biased 
towards research activity, particularly to research in the sciences (Dill, 2009), and  this could 
lead to a HEI altering its mission to scientific research activity even though it might formerly 
have pursued teaching excellence (Shin and Toutkoushian, 2011). In addition, the highly-
ranked elite universities become the benchmarks for the lower-ranked HEIs to mimic, thereby 
ensuring a reduction in diversity between universities (Morphew and Swanson, 2011). Yet 
diversity in higher education is desirable because it stimulates a dynamic sector giving more 
choice to students (HEFCE, 2012), and reducing this choice might be socially undesirable 
because of the negative impact on student access caused by imperfect geographical mobility 
(De Fraja and Valbonesi, 2012; Kelchtermans and Verboven, 2010).  
Finally university rankings suggest a precision which is unlikely to be supported by detailed 
examination of the data: the methodology is such that differences in rankings, which can 
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appear large, conceal the fact that there are only very small differences in the scores from 
which the rankings have been derived (Longden, 2011).19 It is therefore important to know 
whether or not the differences in rankings between HEIs are ‘real’ or significant in a 
statistical sense. Little work has focused on this aspect in the context of individual measures 
or composite indexes. An exception is work by Smith, McKnight and Naylor (2000) who 
examine the performance of HEIs in the UK on the basis of the first destinations of graduates, 
and find that the differences in performance are significantly different only for the top 10 and 
the bottom 10 institutions. Thus, rankings not only leave the higher education sector open to 
undesirable behaviour and consequences, but these effects may be based on rankings that 
have little meaning. This point is pursued further below. 
Performance measures based on frontier estimation techniques 
Deriving efficiency scores using DEA or SFA involves complex procedures such that the 
end-user loses direct engagement with the data. The advantage is that it becomes more 
difficult to alter behaviour merely to affect a position in the rankings, so these approaches are 
less likely to incite gaming behaviour. However, the availability of managerial information 
on benchmarks which inefficient universities should use to improve their performance means 
that HEIs still have the opportunity genuinely to improve their efficiency.   
This might lead one to suppose that rankings based on frontier estimation techniques are 
more reliable than the simple rankings based on aggregating individual measures. There are 
two caveats to this. First the production relationship in higher education is extremely difficult 
to model, and incorporating quantity and quality of all aspects of a university’s activities can 
challenge the estimation methods. Second, as with the simple approach, point estimates of 
each university’s relative position are highly suspect. The estimation of confidence intervals 
                                                          
19 Related to this is the problem of the volatility of rankings over time which might be due to changing 
methodology or might have alternative explanations. This idea is explored elsewhere (Longden, 2011, pp96-99). 
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around efficiency estimates derived from both SFA and DEA suggests that there is 
considerable overlap in performance between many universities (Johnes, 2014b). 
Groupings rather than point estimates 
Point estimates of rankings are misleading since there is likely no significant difference in 
efficiency between many universities, and possibly even damaging if they result in 
undesirable gaming behaviour. How can we gain some idea of the performance of 
universities whilst avoiding these problems? An idea being mooted is that performance 
groupings, rather than point estimates, would be more appropriate (Bougnol and Dula, 2006). 
This raises the question of how to construct the groups. One suggestion by Barr, Durchholz 
and Seiford (2000) is to use DEA to produce tiers of universities (known as ‘peeling the DEA 
onion’): the first application of DEA to the data produces a set of efficient universities which 
are removed to form the top tier. DEA is then applied to the truncated data set, and the 
efficient universities removed to form the second tier. This process, or ‘peeling’, continues 
until all universities are assigned to a tier (figure 6).  
Figure 6 here 
The advantage of DEA is that it can be applied in either context: producing a composite index 
from a number of performance indicators or the production approach relating inputs to 
outputs. In the former case, the ‘benefit of the doubt’ version of DEA is used whereby the 
indicators are classified as ‘outputs’ and the single ‘input’ is equal to one for all universities 
(Cherchye et al., 2007). This therefore constructs a composite index using objectively derived 
weightings which differ for each university and are constructed to show each HEI in its best 
possible light. In practice this means that each university is measured against universities 
with similar mission or objectives, and hence diversity in the sector is preserved. 
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We illustrate the peeling method using the data from The Complete University Guide 2015-16 
and applying the DEA ‘benefit of the doubt’ model to the data. The peeling approach yields 4 
groupings of universities (shown in table 5; universities are ordered alphabetically within 
group). Alongside the HEIs in each tier are the ranking assigned in The Complete University 
Guide 2015-16. The average of the rankings of the universities in each tier  are very broadly 
in line with the tiers produced in that the average for the first tier is the lowest, and so on. But 
there are some big differences between ranking and tier for some universities. This might 
arise because of the calculation of the weightings in DEA; but it is possible to restrict the 
weighting assigned to each measure if this were desired. 
Table 5 here 
This analysis is offered purely as an example of how a tiered approach to performance 
assessment might work in practice; alternative approaches should be explored and evaluated. 
It seems, however, that a move away from specific rankings can only have beneficial effects 
on the performance of the higher education sector.   
Conclusions 
This chapter summarises approaches to performance assessments and rankings of universities 
particularly over the last 30 to 40 years. Various approaches – ranging from individual 
indicators through composite indexes to the technical efficiency approach permitted by recent 
developments in frontier estimation techniques – have been presented and compared. The 
chapter ends with the suggestion that the potentially pernicious and self-seeking effects of the 
commonly-applied simple approach to performance measurement could be reduced by 
adopting a tiered performance approach, using frontier estimation, to produce groupings 
rather than specific rankings. Throughout, the possible approaches have been illustrated using 
data from recent media rankings in the UK. It is apparent that different approaches deliver 
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different conclusions and the user of performance indicators and rankings should beware: 
university rankings should come with a serious health warning and be handled with care. 
Indeed, the words of Gareth Williams from more than 20 years ago continue to be relevant 
today: ‘Like all quantitative performance indicators these figures raise more questions than 
they answer’ (Williams, 1992a, p147).  
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Table 1: Rank correlations of 10 indicators from The Complete University Guide 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Entry standards          
2. Student satisfaction 0.17         
3. Research assessment 0.84* 0.14        
4. Research intensity 0.73* 0.27* 0.73*       
5. Graduate prospects 0.79* 0.29* 0.67* 0.61*      
6. Staff-student ratio 0.73* 0.22* 0.77* 0.69* 0.59*     
7. Academic services spend 0.57* 0.11 0.60* 0.54* 0.53* 0.62*    
8. Facilities spend 0.21* 0.11 0.27* 0.27* 0.23* 0.21* 0.29*   
9. Good honours 0.86* 0.23* 0.78* 0.76* 0.75* 0.68* 0.54* 0.15  
10. Degree completion 0.76* 0.33* 0.68* 0.62* 0.77* 0.63* 0.48* 0.27* 0.75* 
Notes: * = significant at the 5% significance level. Note that The Complete University Guide 
uses student-staff ratio (indictor 6) and this has been reversed for the purposes of the 
correlation table to ensure that a higher value is consistent with more favourable 
performance. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Weightings used to produce an overall performance indicator in The Complete 
University Guide and rank correlation between the overall ranking and its components 
 
 Weight Correlation 
1. Entry standards 1.0 0.91 
2. Student satisfaction 1.5 0.35 
3. Research assessment 1.0 0.86 
4. Research intensity 0.5 0.78 
5. Graduate prospects 1.0 0.83 
6. Staff-student ratio 1.0 0.82 
7. Academic services spend 0.5 0.64 
8. Facilities spend 0.5 0.34 
9. Good honours 1.0 0.89 
10. Degree completion 1.0 0.85 
Source: http://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/league-tables/methodology/ accessed 
29th June 2015 
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Table 3: Weightings for the 10 principal components (PC) associated with The Complete 
University Guide data 
 
 Principal components 
The Complete 
University Guide 
dimensions 
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 PC10 
1. Entry standards 0.39 -0.05 0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.18 0.28 0.24 -0.81 
2. Student 
satisfaction 
0.13 0.65 -0.59 0.37 0.25 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.07 -0.02 
3. Research 
assessment 
0.35 -0.09 -0.00 -0.28 0.40 -0.40 0.66 0.14 -0.07 0.06 
4. Research 
intensity 
0.36 0.07 0.04 -0.21 0.35 -0.13 -0.43 -0.68 -0.20 -0.04 
5. Graduate 
prospects 
0.36 0.06 -0.06 0.10 -0.47 -0.39 -0.22 0.28 -0.54 0.25 
6. Staff-student 
ratio 
0.35 -0.21 0.07 0.07 0.37 0.66 -0.13 0.37 -0.29 0.12 
7. Academic 
services spend 
0.27 -0.35 0.19 0.80 0.02 -0.13 0.13 -0.24 0.19 0.05 
8. Facilities spend 0.07 0.61 0.77 0.07 0.05 -0.00 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.05 
9. Good honours 0.38 -0.02 -0.09 -0.24 -0.13 0.01 -0.22 0.10 0.68 0.50 
10. Degree 
completion 
0.34 0.16 -0.05 -0.11 -0.51 0.45 0.46 -0.39 -0.07 -0.08 
% variation 58.1 10.8 9.4 6.1 5.2 2.9 2.5 2.0 1.9 1.1 
 
 
Table 4: Rank correlations between the first two principal components and the 
university ranking 
 
 1 2 
1. University ranking   
2. Principal component 1 0.98 1.00 
3. Principal component 2 0.15 0.08 
Note: Data sourced from The Complete University Guide 2015-16 
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Tier 1 (Average ranking 42.15) Rank Tier 2 (Average ranking  54.85) Rank Tier 3 (Average ranking 69.53) Rank Tier 4 (Average ranking 98.71) Rank 
Bath 11 Abertay 95 Aberdeen 40 Bedfordshire 110 
Birmingham 18 Aberystwyth 86 Anglia Ruskin 115 Bolton 121 
Bishop Grosseteste 117 Aston 32 Arts University Bournemouth 57 Brighton 76 
Bristol 15 Bangor 58 Bournemouth 54 Canterbury Christ Church 106 
Brunel University London 49 Bath Spa 70 Central Lancashire 91 Derby 94 
Buckinghamshire New 113 Birmingham City 88 Chester 93 London Metropolitan 126 
Cambridge 1 Bradford 63 Chichester 77 London South Bank 119 
Cardiff 31 City 41 De Montfort 54 Manchester Metropolitan 73 
Cardiff Metropolitan 79 Cumbria 111 Dundee 42 Newman 120 
Coventry 48 East Anglia 16 Edge Hill 82 Northumbria 60 
Durham 5 Falmouth 70 Edinburgh 20 Plymouth 90 
East London 124 Glasgow 30 Edinburgh Napier 92 Portsmouth 59 
Essex 34 Glasgow Caledonian 83 Gloucestershire 80 Salford 96 
Exeter 10 Glyndwr 123 Greenwich 107 Southampton Solent 122 
Heriot-Watt 37 Goldsmiths, University of London 50 Huddersfield 74 Staffordshire 103 
Imperial College London 4 Harper Adams 60 Hull 63 Teesside 98 
Loughborough 11 Hertfordshire 75 Kingston 104 Worcester 105 
Middlesex 89 Keele 46 Leeds Beckett 114   
Northampton 83 Kent 22 Lincoln 51   
Oxford 2 King's College London 23 Liverpool 39   
Queen's, Belfast 36 Lancaster 9 Manchester 28   
Royal Agricultural University 85 Leeds 19 Nottingham 25   
St Andrews 5 Leeds Trinity 101 Nottingham Trent 53   
St George's, University of 
London 
43 Leicester 24 Oxford Brookes 54   
Strathclyde 38 Liverpool Hope 97 Queen Margaret 78   
Surrey 8 Liverpool John Moores 68 Queen Mary, University of London 33   
  London School of Economics 3 Reading 29   
  Newcastle 26 Royal Holloway, University of London 34   
  Robert Gordon 63 Sheffield Hallam 72   
  Roehampton 66 SOAS, University of London 43   
  Sheffield 27 South Wales 102   
  Southampton 14 St Mary's, Twickenham 109   
  Sussex 21 Stirling 47   
  Trinity Saint David 125 Sunderland 116   
  Ulster 66 Swansea 45   
  University College London 13 University for the Creative Arts 52   
  University of the Arts, London 80 West London 108   
  Warwick 7 West of Scotland 118   
  West of England, Bristol 62 Westminster 100   
  York 17 Winchester 86   
Table 5: Groupings of universities produced by the peeling approach applied to data from The Complete University Guide 2015-16 
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Figure 1: Plot of first two principal components 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A production framework for universities 
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Figure 3: Measuring technical efficiency of a university 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The PPF estimated by DEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Teaching/staff 
Research/staff 
O 
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
Teaching/staff 
Research/staff 
• F 
O 
• F’ 
•  
•  
•  
• F’ 
• F 
 A 
 B 
 C 
 D 
Production possibility frontier (PPF) 
30 
 
 
Figure 5: The PPF estimated by SFA 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Peeling the DEA onion 
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